Stuff that matters. Mimesis and (the end of) magic in Walter Benjamin by Barale, Alice
48 Alice Barale 
 
 48
ALICE BARALE 
(Università degli Studi di Firenze) 
 
STUFF THAT MATTERS. 
MIMESIS AND (THE END OF) MAGIC  
IN WALTER BENJAMIN 
 
 
 
 
1. In a fragment of 1933, Benjamin compares the process of imita-
tion or mimesis to that of the comic: «To imitate may be a magic 
act; but the person who imitates removes at the same time magic 
from nature, because he brings nature closer to language. To bring 
nature closer to language is an essential function of the comic» 
(Benjamin 1933a, 956). The fragment goes on talking about laugh-
ing, but we’ll see that later. Let’s focus for the moment on the an-
tinomic character of mimesis that is described in this passage. Imi-
tation is defined here as an act of magic and as an overcoming of 
magic at the same time. We can notice very shortly that this was 
actually also Aby Warburg’s problem. In Warburg’s essay on Luth-
er, quoted by Benjamin in the Trauerspielbuch, images are shaped 
by an inner dialectic between their demonic power and the fight 
against demons that they permit (Warburg 1920). But what does 
the comic have to do with all that? The comic and mimesis – Ben-
jamin argues here – have one thing in common: they bring nature 
closer to language. There is an aspect of nature then that is far 
from language: an extraneous aspect, which comes to be ap-
proached through the comic and through mimesis. 
This necessity of taking away magic from nature corres-
ponds actually in these years for Benjamin to another similar ne-
cessity: that of taking away magic from language. What does that 
mean? When Benjamin writes his famous essay On the mimetic fa-
culty, in the same year of this fragment, his aim is – as he writes to 
his friend and Kabbalah scholar Gerschom Scholem – that of set-
ting a connection (a «problematic» connection, but a connection 
still) between his early meditation on language and the dialectic 
materialism (Benjamin 1931, 523). This connection, according to 
Benjamin, was already possible as he was writing his book on the 
baroque drama, but it has become clear to him only at this mo-
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ment (Benjamin 1931, 523). Now, to set a connection between 
materialism and the philosophy of language means – Benjamin 
writes – to «liquidate the magic function of language» in favor of 
its «profane function» (Benjamin 1933a)1. 
Of course Benjamin’s friend Scholem was not at all enthu-
siastic about all these strange statements. Scholem actually sees a 
contradiction between Benjamin’s aim for a «Liquidation der Ma-
gie der Sprache», that the materialistic perspective requires, and 
the theological and mystical «inspiration» that runs all through 
Benjamin’s writings (Scholem 1975, 259). And we can actually not 
blame him for his perplexity. Let’s consider, for example, the cen-
tral idea of Benjamin’s theory of mimesis. That is the idea of «im-
material similarity» (Benjamin 1933b, 210-213). The word in 
German is unsinnliche Ähnlichkeit, so more literally «non-sensuous 
similarity»2. Anyway, that’s an idea that doesn’t seem very ‘ma-
terial’… 
In this regard, Scholem argues that in Benjamin’s thought 
the idea of matter arises always only in a completely magical sen-
se (Scholem 1975, 259). Is that true? The notion of the comic, 
from which we have started, can give us a thread. 
 
2. If we go back to the book on the German baroque drama (1928), 
we see that here Benjamin says something very peculiar about the 
comic. He’s talking about some comic figures of the Shakespea-
rean dramas – such as Jago or Polonio, later also Richard III – and 
he says that in all these cases the comic «emigrates into» drama 
(Benjamin 1928, 306). That means that the comic becomes small-
er and goes literally inside drama. This is something that relies – 
Benjamin says – on the inner nature of the comic. The opposite 
can not happen: drama can not emigrate into the comic. Why? And 
what does all that have to do with mimesis? 
It actually has to do with the idea of matter that mimesis, as 
we have seen, implies. Or better, as we shall see, with one of the 
possible ideas of matter. In fact Polonio, Richard III and Jago are 
for Benjamin all stuntmen, all doubles, of a very strange and anti-
quate figure that comes forth at the end of The origin of German 
                                                          
1 On the «magic of language» and the necessity of its «liquidation» in Benjamin’s thought 
see at least Hanssen 2004, Menninghaus 1980, Weigel 1997 and 2008. On Benjamin’s 
and Scholem’s discussion on language see Tagliacozzo 2016.  
2 On that see at least Caygill 1998, 5-6; Gebauer, Wulf 1995, 269-280; Hanssen 2004; 
Friedlander 2012, 285-86; Opitz 2000; Weigel 1997. 
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tragic drama: the figure of the devil. From the Middle Ages on – 
Benjamin states – the devil has become the symbol of the entire 
sphere of matter, and in the figure of the devil, he explains here, 
matter laughs. The laugh of the devil is the laugh of matter. A 
laugh that actually says something important (something terri-
ble): it says the failure, in relation to matter, of every «meaning» 
that our language can have (Benjamin 1928, 400-401). Every 
meaning is in vain: with that melancholy turns into laughing. 
The most important thing to note, nevertheless, is that there 
is a paradox in all that: in fact, through this figure of the devil, mat-
ter acquires a human appearance, it becomes something spiritual. 
It seems to be connected with the animal sphere, but it is in fact 
much more spiritual than the sphere of meaning and the sphere of 
language that it teases. The matter acquires in short – Benjamin 
writes – a «redundancy» or an «exuberance of spirit» (ibidem). A 
redundancy that is an attempt – a crazy attempt – to overcome the 
realm of animals (of creatures) and of their attempts with lan-
guage: to jump over that. Nothing is more magic, then, than this 
idea of matter: here Scholem’s remark proves to be completely 
right. 
 
3. There is yet another idea of matter that has an important role 
already in this period – already in the book on the German baro-
que drama –, even though its presence is not so evident as the 
other one. It is the idea of «Stoff». The Stoff is the material (it is the 
‘stuff’) things are made of. In the passage of The origin of German 
tragic drama that we are going to examine, it is the material of the 
works of art, in opposition to their external structure (Gerüst). 
Here Benjamin argues, in fact, that the baroque poets were despe-
rately concentrated on the external structure of their works and 
for this reason they couldn’t reach the material stratus (Stoff-
schicht: a kind of geological stratus) that constitutes the deeper 
and vital force of the works of art and that is – this is even more 
important – something that they have in common, something sha-
red (Benjamin 1928, 229)3. 
It is interesting for us that exactly this problem constitutes 
the starting point from which the question of mimesis arises for 
the first time, in a work that prepares for many aspects The origin 
of German tragic drama, the essay on Calderon and Hebbel (Ben-
                                                          
3 For an investigation on the «material» as a locus of potentiality see Benjamin 2015. 
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jamin 1923). In this work Benjamin explains that the shared di-
mension of the material, which is what our modern search for ori-
ginality leaves behind, has to do not only with tradition and lan-
guage, but also – here comes the new term – with «nature». The 
material is «for the individual work» of art, Benjamin argues, what 
nature is «for art» in general (Benjamin 1923, 248). In this essay 
mimesis is conceived, actually, as the way we can think this rela-
tion between nature and art. Already the Greeks – Benjamin states 
– thought this relation in terms of mimesis. 
Here comes, nevertheless, another problem, because Benja-
min refers to the ancient tragic mimesis and says that it is a trans-
formation of the ancient myth – this is a question that will be very 
important in The origin of German tragic drama4. It seems, howev-
er, that we loose with that the term of nature. What does nature 
have to do with all that? We can find an answer if we consider 
what comes to be transformed inside the myth. What is «called in-
to question» – not only transformed then – in the tragic mimesis is 
the representation, inside the myth, of the «world order» (Benja-
min 1923, 249). Of the order of nature then, as it is represented in 
language. We’ll come back to that. 
Let’s return, for the moment, to the question of the material 
(Stoff). What the material is inside the single representation and 
in what sense – if not in the classical sense of tradition – it can 
break our isolation remains an open question inside this essay. A 
question that will start to find an answer much later, in the period 
of the essay on mimesis. Which is also the period of the first ver-
sion of the Berlin childhood. 
 
4. One of the central ideas of Benjamin’s childhood memories is, in 
fact, that of the «Stoffwelt» (stuff-world; Benjamin 1938, 61). It is 
the whole material world. One of the secrets of children and of 
primitive men is that you can actually transform into everything 
this world offers to you (Benjamin 1929, 185-187). But what Ben-
jamin tries to think here is also the philosophical meaning of this 
material. If we look for a definition of the Stoffwelt, we can find it 
in a chapter that is called Die Mummerehlen. It is «the mute, soft 
and flocky element that – like the snow tempest in the small snow-
globes – clouds over inside the core of things» (Benjamin 1932-
                                                          
4 See on that Birnbaum 2009. 
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1938, 10)5. Clouds over: meaning at the same time that it com-
pacts, like clouds, and that it becomes covered. 
This definition can help us, from my point of view, to under-
stand the way Benjamin explains, in his essay on the mimetic fa-
culty, his idea of the «immaterial similarity» and the materialism 
that, despite Scholem, he ascribes to it. To describe the immaterial 
similarity inside language, Benjamin says that «if words meaning 
the same thing in different languages are arranged about that sig-
nified as their center, we have to inquire how they all — while of-
ten possessing not the slightest similarity to one another – are 
similar to the signified at their center» (Benjamin 1933b, 212). 
This is quite mysterious and recalls, as Benjamin writes in the first 
version of the essay – Doctrine of the similar – the «mystical or 
theological theories of language» (Benjamin 1933c, 207-208)6. But 
in the definitive version of the essay (On the mimetic faculty) he 
removes this comment, because the aim is, as we have seen, that 
of taking away all magic from language. Now I think that we can 
understand the materialistic character Benjamin ascribes to this 
idea of «immaterial similarity», if we think the invisible «center» 
he’s talking about here as the «flocky element» at the «core of 
things» that we have just seen. In fact this element is something 
you can touch, or better you can try to be touched by – like the «ir-
resolute flakes of the first snow», Benjamin says (Benjamin 1938, 
60). And it is something you can try to become enveloped by: 
Mummerehlen comes from ‘mummen’, which means to mask, but 
in the sense of being enveloped, like a mummy. It is not something 
in front of us then, like the demonic matter of The origin of German 
tragic drama, but it is everywhere, on every side, like snow again. 
This diffusive character of the material, however, has a limit. 
It has a limit in the fact that it compacts, as we have seen, inside 
the core of things. And this is precisely also the limit of its magic. 
Benjamin had already talked about a «magic of matter» in his es-
say on language in 1916. «There is also a magic of matter» he 
wrote (Benjamin 1916, 147)7. «Also»: the other one is the magic of 
                                                          
5 «Das Stumme, Lockere, Flockige, das gleich dem Schneegestöber in den kleinen Glas-
kugeln sich im Kern der Dinge wölkt» (trans. mine). On the connection between this text 
and the essays on mimesis, see Steiner 2004, 150 ff. 
6 On magic, also in the context of the essays on mimesis, see Downing 2011. 
7 On the connection between the essay On language and that On the mimetic faculty, see 
Weigel 1997, in part. pp. 90-93. The nexus Weigel traces between immediacy and «Ent-
stellung» (deformation) is indeed a central point. Mimesis could start, from this point of 
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human language. Both, language and matter have a magic that 
consists – according to Benjamin in 1916 – in the fact that they 
«communicate» themselves. There is an aspect of immediacy in 
this communication, and we can call this something magic (Ben-
jamin 1916, 142). Both the magic of matter and the magic of lan-
guage find, nevertheless, a limit in the fact that there is a core of 
things – as we have just seen – that is mute. This limit had also al-
ready been clearly marked in 1916: «things are mute», Benjamin 
wrote (Benjamin 1916, 147). 
What has changed now, in comparison with this first essay 
on language? I think we can understand that if we consider one of 
the strangest passages of the essay of 1916. Benjamin writes here 
that things communicate not only to humans but also among 
themselves. They do that through a sort of «material community 
(stoffliche Gemeinschaft)» (Benjamin 1916, 147). This material 
community is exactly, I think, what the idea of the material (Stoff) 
– which is developed in 1933 – permits to join. It permits to think 
of taking part to it. 
 
5. That happens, of course, first of all through our body: «The first 
material upon which the mimetic faculty attempts to operate is 
our body» (Benjamin 1939, 127)8. In this regard, Benjamin writes, 
in another fragment, that the focus in the mimetic process is not 
so much on the eyes, but rather on the mouth (Benjamin 1935, 
958): on our attempt, then, to give a word to things. In order to do 
that, however, language has to make a «detour [Umweg]» through 
the whole body. A detour that constitutes – Benjamin writes – an 
overcoming of myth (Benjamin 1935, 958). 
An overcoming then, if we go back to the essay on Calderon, 
of the «world order» – of the order of nature – as it is represented 
in language. And this happens through the rupture of the isolation 
both of language and of nature. Both the magic isolation of lan-
guage and the magic isolation of nature – whose common product 
is, as we have seen, the myth – are broken now, trough their en-
counter. An encounter that can last, like every encounter, only for 
a moment. The contact between the significative aspect of lan-
                                                                                                                                        
view, already with perception. For this hypothesis see Desideri 2017. On the connection 
between the essay On language and that On the mimetic faculty, see also Hanssen 2004.  
8 For an investigation of this passage see Desideri 2005 and 2012. 
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guage and its mimetic relationship to the material world9 has to 
be searched every time again. There can be no redundancy in it. 
If there’s a kind of laugh that is inherent to this moment, 
then – as the fragment from which we have started states – it is 
certainly not the redundant laugh of the demonic matter. It is not 
the laugh of Polonio or Jago. It could be rather, if we want to re-
main inside the Shakespearean context, the laugh of Puck that va-
nishes in a while and brings at the end everything in order again – 
or, at least, it promises to do so10. A kind of laugh, then, that is not 
teasing, but rather – as Benjamin writes in the fragment from 
which we have started – «a chaos of articulation». 
                                                          
9 See on that Benjamin 1933b, 722: «The mimetic element in language can, like a flame, 
manifest itself only through a kind of bearer. This bearer is the semiotic element».  
10 W. Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, V.1. 
